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Abstract: This paper develops a model in which firm managers maximize their own compensation by using
accruals to manage reported earnings. The results of the model suggest that the form of the managerial
compensation function and managerial time preferences may have an important influence on the relationship
between accruals and latent earnings. Among the possible relationships suggested by the model are strategies
we call Smooth Income, Occasional Big Bath, Live for Today, and Maximize Variability, each of which suggests
a different reporting strategy pursued by managers. Most empirical tests of accruals are inconsistent with this
and other theoretical models because they include a single earnings variable in a linear regression analysis.
Instead, we document the reporting of accruals by two firms, Sunbeam and Citicorp, that is consistent with the
“Live for Today” and “Occasional Big Bath” strategies.
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I. Introduction
After being named CEO of Sunbeam Corporation in June 1996, Al Dunlap brought about
dramatic change in the firm’s reported financial performance. In 1996, Sunbeam reported a loss in
excess of $200 million --- followed the next year by net income of almost $110 million. When he
accepted the CEO position,  Dunlap negotiated a compensation package that included substantial
stock grants, stock options, and a large salary and benefits. With the improved performance, Dunlap’s
salary and benefits package was increased further in 1998. In 1998 and 1999 Sunbeam reported losses
and Dunlap was no longer CEO. According to Laing (1998), much of the variation in Sunbeam’s
financials reflected a discretionary use of accruals and other accounting ploys to move expenses to
1996 and increase reported net income in 1997.
During the second quarter of 1987, Citicorp announced that it was adding $3 billion to its
allowance for loan losses in recognition that it would likely realize significant losses on some of the
sovereign debt the bank owned. This quarterly allocation was more than 70 percent greater than the
total size of the allowance at the beginning of the year. Zweig (1995) described the provisions reported
by Citicorp as “the largest amount that Citicorp could set aside without being seriously wounded.” In
retrospect, it appears that John Reed, CEO of Citicorp, decided to formally recognize the entire
understatement of the allowance in prior periods via a large provision during one brief period.
These dramatic examples of earnings volatility and the general use of accounting accruals to
manage earnings have attracted the interest of both policymakers and academics.  Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Levitt focused on the use of accounting accruals to mislead2
investors in a talk he called “The ‘Numbers’ Game.”  In September 1998  Levitt argued that “the
motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business
practices.”
1 In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path,
wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation.”  His address pointed to five
common accounting gimmicks.  One of these “gimmicks” was what he called “Miscellaneous ‘Cookie
Jar Reserves,’” which included the use of “unrealistic assumptions” to estimate accruals such as sales
returns, loan losses and warranty costs.  He argued that firms using such practices “stash accruals in
cookie jars during good times and reach into them when needed in the bad times.”
The use of accounting gimmicks raises important questions, such as, What are the incentives
to manage earnings? and What is the optimal reporting policy given these incentives? A firm’s use of
discretionary accruals is under the control of its senior management, especially the firm’s CEO. The
policy set by any CEO for determining discretionary accruals may be expected to be one which
maximizes the CEO’s utility. Theoretical analysis from Lambert (1984), Dye (1988) and Fudenberg
and Tirole (1995) suggests that the shareholder wealth maximizing compensation contract offered by
the firm to the CEO will induce the CEO to smooth earnings. Other theoretical analysis from Healy
(1985) and Degeorge, Patel and Zechhauser (1999) suggests that for some compensation functions,
the CEO will set a policy of hitting the earnings target via accrual management, if possible.
2 However,
if accruals management will be insufficient to raise reported income to the target, the CEO will seek to
minimize current reported expenses in order to provide additional discretion to boost future earnings.
Thus, the existing theoretical literature finds that firms will attain their earnings target if possible, but it
may disagree on what firms will do if they cannot attain the target.
This paper extends the existing literature by providing a more general analysis of how a firm’s
expense accrual management policies depend upon CEO compensation.
3 CEO compensation is
allowed to depend on a fixed bonus for attaining a reported earnings target, a linear variable bonus for3
exceeding the target, and a linear variable penalty for reporting income below the target. In addition,
CEO time preference is allowed to vary between zero and infinity. The results suggest that simple
variations on these four parameters are able to produce widely different earnings management policies.
Our model incorporates the Healy and Degeorge, et al. results, which we call the “Occasional Big
Bath,” as one of four possible outcomes. Another outcome, “Smooth Income,” produces a result
similar to Lambert (1984), Dye (1988), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) in a setting similar to that of
Fudenberg and Tirole.
4 A third possible result, which we call “Live for Today,” is that managers may
always maximize reported earnings by minimizing accruals. The fourth, possibly surprising, outcome is
labeled “Maximize Variability” and arises when variable bonuses are not limited as in Healy, with the
result that firms with sufficiently high or sufficiently low earnings will move away from their short-
term net income target. The outcome that best describes the behavior of any single firm is a function
of the manager’s compensation function and time preference. Ours is the first research to provide a
theoretical framework for the Live for Today and Maximize Variability outcomes, and a general model
that characterizes all four outcomes dependent on the choice of key parameters.
We examine the implications of the model for the “Live for Today” and “Occasional Big
Bath” strategies by documenting the reporting behavior of Sunbeam and Citicorp around key events in
each firm’s recent performance. The two case studies demonstrate situations where manager
compensation and a firm’s ability to meet its earnings target seemingly affect the reporting of accruals
in a manner consistent with these outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops the model.
The third section develops the model’s results.  The fourth section presents the case studies and the
paper concludes with summary remarks.4
II. The Model
The model includes three agents, a manager, the firm’s board of directors, and an auditor. The
manager is risk neutral and discounts future earnings at the rate of r per period. The firm’s directors set
the manager’s compensation contract, which provides the manager’s objective function.  The auditor
specifies minimum and maximum levels of discretionary accruals, DA.
The model has two dates.  At the first date, t, the manager determines  DA given the
predetermined level of the firm’s latent earnings, LEt.  The combination of the fixed and discretionary
items yields the firm’s reported earnings, REt:
REt = LEt – DAt. (1)
The board of directors authorizes the manager to receive a salary, normalized to zero, and a bonus
payment at time t, BPt, which is a function of the relationship between the target earnings, TEt, set by
the board of directors and realized earnings.  Although target earnings may differ between periods 1
and 2, the other terms of the bonus function are the same in both periods j, j=t, t+1:
BP(REj) = FB + VB(REj – TEj) if REj ‡ TEj, and
BP(REj) = VP(REj – TEj) otherwise, (2)
with
FB, VB, VP   ‡ 0.
where
FB  = fixed-bonus payment,
VB = variable-bonus rate, and
VP = variable-penalty rate.
5  
The reported earnings of the firm at time t+1, REt+1, depend on a random component and a
fixed component.  The random component is the latent earnings of the firm from operations, LEt+1,
which has a probability density function of p(LEt+1). The fixed component is the negative of the firm’s5
DA at time  t added back to net income.  The fixed component exists as a simplified way of
operationalizing the assumption that current discretionary accruals constrain future discretionary
accruals.  If DAt is positive, the subsequent recovery into income recognizes that excess accruals in
one period provides a sort of hidden capital which will be taken back into income in a subsequent
period. If DAt is negative, adding DAt back into income in t+1 recognizes that firms have reduced
discretion in future periods.
The value of reported earnings at t+1, REt+1, including both the random and fixed items, is
REt+1 = LEt+1 + DAt (3)
Thus, the manager’s objective function is:
max DA E(ME) = BP(REt) + E(BP(REt+1)) /(1+r) (4)
where
ME = discounted value of managerial earnings, and
E    = expectations operator.
The firm’s auditors impose limits on management’s choice of DAt to maximize its objective
function.  These constraints take two forms:
MINAt £ DAt £ MAXAt
where
MINAt = minimum DAt permitted by the auditor, and
MAXAt = maximum DAt permitted by the auditor.
Although auditors would rarely, if ever, publicly disclose their limits on discretionary accruals, the
existence of such limits is consistent with regulatory behavior such as that evidenced by the SEC when
it recently forced SunTrust to reduce its reported loan loss provisions.
66
III. Model results
The model results are trivial in the extreme case where the auditors’ constraints eliminate any
discretion the manager has over loan loss provisions.  In this case
DAt = MINAt = MAXA,
where
MINAt =  minimum DAt permitted by the auditor, and
MAXAt =  maximum DAt permitted by the auditor
The remainder of this subsection considers the problem when the manager has some
discretion over the choice of DAt.  The first two parts analyze special cases in which the manager must
attain the time t reported earnings target, and when the manager cannot attain the time t reported
earnings target, respectively.  Subsection 2.3 builds on the first two parts to consider the general
problem of a manager’s choice of DAt.
A. Firm is constrained to attain the reported earnings target
Assume that latent earnings at time t are sufficiently high so that the firm will attain its time t
earnings target for any value of DAt that lies within the bounds set by the auditors.  That is,
MAXAt  £ TLEt - LEt
with
TLEt+1 = TEt+1 – DAt
Where TLEt+1 represents latent earnings required to obtain the target for reported earnings at time
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where the value of DAt must also satisfy the constraints on DA’s minimum and maximum values.  A
value for DAt may exist that satisfies this condition within the constraints, but such a result is not
guaranteed.  For example, as the manager’s discount rate  r  approaches infinity, the value of this
derivative will be negative for all values of DAt, unless either the time t+1 bonuses, FB or VB, or the
marginal penalty, VP, also goes to infinity.  Consider the case where a manager plans to retire before
time  t+1.  The manager would choose the lowest (largest negative value) discretionary accrual
permitted by the auditor, which may go to infinity.  In this case, all managers, even those at firms with
unusually “high” earnings, would use their discretion to minimize loan loss provisions and raise net
income.
Alternatively, the derivative could take on a positive value for all values of DAt. Such a case
could occur if the variable bonus, VB, was zero, but either the fixed bonus, FB, or the variable penalty,
VP, was non-zero.
B.         Firm is constrained to miss its reported earnings target
A second case is that in which latent earnings at time t are sufficiently low so that the firm will
not be able attain its time t reported earnings target for any value of DAt that lies within the bounds set
by the auditors and regulators.  That is, assume8
MINAt  ‡ TLEt – LEt.
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where the value of DAt at this point must also satisfy the constraints on DAt’s minimum and
maximum values.  This derivative may be zero for some value of DAt.  However, as is the case where
the manager is guaranteed a time t bonus, the derivative may be either strictly positive or strictly
negative for all values of DAt.  The case where the derivative is strictly positive would occur when the
marginal penalty for missing the time t target is greater than the marginal gain from increasing the
probability of attaining the time t+1 target.  The case where the derivative is strictly negative occurs
when the time t penalty is less than the marginal gain from increasing the probability of attaining the
time t+1 target.9
Thus, we do not necessarily obtain the result that the firm will always engage in income
smoothing.  The problem is that the time t variable bonus and penalty may be strictly greater than or
less than the expected net present value of the time t+1 bonus and penalty.  Whether time t or time
t+1 considerations dominate depends on four factors.  First, the rate of time discounting from time t
to t+1 makes payments made at time t more valuable than comparable payments at time t+1.  This
tends to make the derivative negative encouraging the firm to take a smaller loan loss provision at time
t.  Second, an increase in the probability of obtaining the constant bonus at time t+1 tends to make the
derivative positive.  The increased probability of a t+1 bonus encourages the firm to take a larger loan
loss provision at time t.  The third factor is the effect of DAt on the probability that the firm will attain
its time t target.  Finally, the time consideration depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal
variable bonus, VB, and marginal variable penalty, VP.
C. General results
The previous two sections present special cases that may be combined to analyze the general
problem facing the firm.  Such a general case would allow for the possibility that the manager’s choice
of DAt determines whether the firm will attain its time t earnings target.  That is,
MAXAt  ‡ TLEt – LEt. ‡ MINA.
The solution  procedure in this case involves solving equations (5) and  (7) subject to appropriate
boundary conditions.  In particular, the manager would solve for the value of DAt that maximizes the
value of managerial earnings if the firm attains the time t earnings target; that is, solve equation  (5)
subject to:
DAt £ TLEt – LEt
DAt ‡ MINAt10
and subject to the first-order conditions given in equation (6).  The manager would solve for the value
of DAt that maximizes the value of managerial earnings.  If the firm does not meet its time t earnings
target, the manager would solve equation (7) subject to:
DAt < MAXAt
DAt ‡  TLEt – LEt.
where the first-order conditions are now given by equation (8). This would yield two candidates for the
value of DAt that maximizes the discounted value of managerial earnings.  The manager would select
whichever value is greater.
Either equation (6) or equation (8) or both may have an interior solution.  However, if neither
equation has an interior solution, there are four possible outcomes as illustrated by Table 1.  Each of
the four quadrants may be reached with a variety of combinations of parameter values.
1.       “Live for Today” due to an infinite discount rate
The manager following the “Live for Today” strategy always minimizes discretionary accruals
and, thus, maximizes reported net income.  This case is most easily obtained by assuming that the
manager has an infinite discount rate and that the marginal variable bonus and penalty coefficients are
positive, VB, VP  > 0.  In this case the manager maximizes time t  net income, and time t+1 income
does not enter the decision because it is subject to an infinite discount rate.  The “Live for Today”
solution to the manager’s problem may be more easily seen in a graphical presentation. To simplify the
presentation, expected discounted managerial earnings are assumed to be a linear function of DAt in
the region between the constraints.
Figure 1, labeled “Live for Today,” illustrates the problem facing the manager when the effect
of DAt on time t income dominates the change in the discounted value of time t+1 fixed and variable
bonuses.  An example of this may be when the manager is going to retire after time t and, hence,
places an infinite discount on time t+1 earnings.  The vertical axis on Figure 1 is the discounted value11
of managerial earnings while the horizontal axis is the manager’s choice of DAt. The discontinuity in
the line occurs at a value of DAt
*, at which managers just attain their time t earnings target, such that at
higher values of DA managers receive no bonuses. The value of DAt in this case will take the lower
bound set by the auditor on DAt.  In this setup, the firm will seek to minimize DAt and maximize time
t earnings because the manager’s objective is to maximize current period expected earnings.
2.         “Smooth Income” due to a non-zero variable penalty
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of DAt on managerial earnings in the income smoothing strategy.
Managers will exactly attain the reported net income target if possible under this strategy.  If reported
earnings cannot be set exactly equal to the target, the manager will maximize DAt if latent time t
earnings are above the target but will minimize DAt if latent earnings are below the target.  This
strategy is implicit in many empirical papers that include earnings in a linear regression model.  This
result may be obtained with:  (1) a finite discount rate, (2) a fixed bonus equal to zero, (3) a marginal
variable bonus equal to zero, VB  = 0, and (4) a variable penalty coefficient VP that is positive. In this
case, if reported earnings exceed the target, the manager will reduce reported earnings to minimize the
expected time t penalty.  However, if earnings are below the target, the manager will increase reported
earnings to reduce the time t penalty.  An increase in DAt increases expected discounted managerial
compensation even though it increases the expected penalty at time t+1 for two reasons:  (1) the time
t+1 penalty is discounted at the manager’s rate of time preference, and (2) the manager may exceed the
time t+1 reported earnings target and owe no penalty.
3.          “Occasional Big Bath” due to a positive fixed bonus
The manager following the “Occasional Big Bath” strategy, illustrated in Figure 3, will seek to
obtain the time t reported earnings target if possible.  However, if the constraints prevent the firm
from obtaining the target, the manager selects the maximum value of DAt permitted. This strategy
would result if:  (1) the discount rate is positive and finite, (2) the same positive fixed-bonus is paid to12
the manager for meeting the reported earnings target in both periods, and (3) VB = VP = 0.  In this
case, the manager will seek first to obtain the time t reported earnings target because the discounted
value of meeting the time t target exceeds that of meeting the time t+1 target.  However, the manager
would prefer to attain the time t target at the highest possible value of DAt in order to maximize the
probability of obtaining the time t+1 target.  Further, if the manager cannot attain the time t target due
to the constraints, he maximizes his probability of attaining the t+1 target by setting the maximum
value of DAt, or by taking a “Big Bath.”
4.         “Maximize Variability” due to a positive variable bonus
The manager following the “Maximize Variability” strategy illustrated in Figure 4, will generally
set values of DAt that move the firm away from its time t target for reported earnings. This result may
be obtained with:  (1) a finite discount rate, (2) a fixed bonus equal to zero, (3) a marginal variable
bonus equal to zero, VB = 0, for all values of reported earnings, and (3) the marginal variable penalty
coefficient is positive, VP > 0.
If latent earnings are above the reported earnings target, the manager maximizes discounted
expected earnings by minimizing DAt, thereby maximizing reported earnings and the time t variable
bonus.  The manager prefers to increase the time  t  bonus rather than boost the time  t+1 bonus
because two “penalties” reduce the benefits of shifting reported net income to time t+1:  (1) the time
t+1 bonus is risky because the firm may not have sufficiently high latent earnings so that the manager
would exceed the time t+1 earnings target, and (2) the time t+1 bonus must be discounted at the
manager’s rate of time preference.
If REt is less than the target, the manager’s variable bonus is equal to VB(DAt – (TEt – LEt)),
so the manager pays a “cost” to maximizing the time t bonus in the form of having part of the
discretionary accrual used to increase reported earnings to the target.  At  DAt
** the “cost” of
minimizing DAt exactly equals the penalty exerted by risk and time discounting in maximizing DAt.13
Finally, if latent earnings are sufficiently below the target (labeled DAt
**), the manager maximizes
discounted earnings by maximizing  DAt and, thereby, maximizing the expected time t+1 variable
bonus.
D.       Extension to stock based compensation.
Table 1 lists four possible strategies from the model for managing accruals depending on
whether latent earnings are above or below the earnings target.  The analysis is Section C shows that
any one of these four strategies is possible if managers are compensated according to reported
accounting earnings.  However, managers’ compensation often depends on more than reported
earnings, such as compensation that depends on the firm’s stock price, which can be substantial.  An
important issue is whether the results of Section C persist in a model where variable compensation
depends on the firm’s stock price?  In particular, would the results persist in a model where the only
variable element of compensation depended solely on the firm’s stock price?
Stock compensation of managers may take a variety of forms, such as a stock grant or
alternatively options on the stock.  The amount of the grant may be fixed or may depend on the firm’s
performance.  The holder of the stock or options may be able to immediately convert the stock or
options to cash, the grant of the stock may be deferred, or the options may have a distant exercise
date.  Alternative forms of the relationship between the stock price and the manager’s earnings may
themselves generate different strategies for the use of accruals by managers.  In order to focus on the
simplest case, assume that the only variable element of compensation is the manager’s stock holdings,
which may be sold by the manager at any time.
The effect of a manager’s stock ownership on the use of accruals depends on how a firm’s
stock price responds to discretionary accruals.  One possibility is that markets can separate
nondiscretionary accruals from discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals have no impact on
firm value.  This case would occur if markets were perfectly efficient.  If manager’s only variable14
compensation is stock-based and discretionary accruals have no effect on a firm’s stock value, then
managers would be indifferent about the level of discretionary accruals.
The extreme opposite assumption is that markets cannot distinguish nondiscretionary from
discretionary accruals.  In this case lower discretionary expense accruals in the first period would boost
the first period’s reported income and stock price.  However, when the nondiscretionary accrual is
reversed in subsequent periods, the firm would report lower earnings and its stock price would be
reduced.  The implication for the management of accruals is similar to that of assuming a combination
of a variable bonus and penalty of equal magnitude in the above model.
An intermediate assumption is that shareholders value the use of discretionary accruals to
smooth reported net income.  Subramanyam (1996) finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  If
shareholders value discretionary accruals used for income smoothing, market participants must
correctly conjecture that most firms engage in income smoothing.  Yet, if managers use their control
over total accruals solely to smooth income, the interesting question about discretionary accruals
becomes ‘why do managers use their control to smooth income?’.  While a variety of hypotheses may
be possible, one hypothesis based on the above results is that managers are penalized for failure to
smooth income.  If the only form of variable compensation is stock compensation, it would imply that
investors “punish” firms that use discretionary accruals to send misleading signals about future
earnings.
Thus, the specific results generated from including stock based compensation are likely to
depend upon the form of the compensation and the response of market participants to discretionary
accruals.  Incorporation of these elements may add additional richness to the above model that focuses
exclusively on variable compensation tied to reported earnings.  However, the model already generates
results that span the possible set of possible responses of discretionary accruals conditional on the15
relationship of latent net earnings to target earnings.  Thus, adding stock-based compensation to the
basic model seems unlikely to alter the insights developed from the model.
IV.  Use of Accruals in Practice
The general model developed above shows the relationship between a firm’s latent earnings
and its use of accruals to manage reported earnings. However, the model also indicates that ambiguity
regarding what amount of accruals will be reported can be resolved by examining the incentives of the
senior manager. Specifically, managers will follow the incentives contained in both their formal
compensation contract and their informal contract with the board of directors. Thus, applying a one-
size-fits-all type model to accruals management may understate the extent of such management
because not all managers have the same incentives. A better way to examine accruals management is to
focus on situations where the incentives provided to each firm’s senior management are well
understood. The cleanest way to capture both the formal contract and informal relationship of the
manager to the board is to focus on situations where all managers are in similar positions and on case
studies where the manager’s incentives can be examined in detail.
One type of research that focuses on managers facing generally similar incentives looks at the
decisions of CEOs in their final years in office. Dechow and Sloan (1991) refer to the mismatch in
CEO’s limited tenure and the long life as the ‘horizon problem.’ They specifically investigate the
relationship between research and development (R&D) expenditures during a CEO’s final years in
office and the form of CEO compensation. The choice of R&D expenditures is similar to the choice
of discretionary accruals in terms of the potential impact on reported earnings. GAAP stipulates that
although the benefits of R&D may accrue far in the future, the expenditures should be expensed when
they are incurred. CEOs whose compensation is based on near-term earnings performance may
successfully increase their near-term compensation by cutting back on R&D expenditures. Implicitly,
this strategy suggests that firms may reject positive net present value investments such that their16
reported earnings are reduced in the long-run. A substantive difference with accruals management,
however, is that R&D expenditures are real as they impact cash inflows and outflows, while accruals
are non-cash.
Dechow and Sloan (1991) focus on the behavior of firms where the CEOs expect to leave in
the near-term and thus have a short-run focus on maximizing earnings. This perspective is similar to
the strategy described previously as ‘Live for Today.’ CEOs may increase compensation in the short-
run by reducing R&D expenditures and increasing reported earnings as well as cash flow.
7 The authors
empirically examine hypotheses related to these arguments and conclude that, on average, the growth
in R&D expenditures declines for two years prior to a CEO’s departure and increases during the first
year of a new CEO’s term in office.
8
The remainder of this section discusses two case studies in which we incorporate information
about the incentives facing the existing CEO to manage accruals and the CEOs’ responses to those
incentives.
A.  Sunbeam Corporation and “Live for Today”
After a tumultuous couple of years, in 1999 the Board of Directors of Sunbeam Corporation
replaced Al Dunlap as CEO due to general mismanagement.
9 Previously, Dunlap had earned the
nickname “Chainsaw Al” for his skill as a workout specialist. In 1994, he was named CEO of Scott
Paper, which was experiencing financial and strategic problems. Dunlap immediately downsized the
firm’s workforce, consolidated operations, and in 1995 sold the remaining entity to Kimberly-Clark for
a substantially higher price than the market value of Scott Paper at the time he took control.
Stockholders of Scott Paper who held on to their shares, new investors, and Dunlap himself were
handsomely rewarded for the quick turnaround and sale. Sunbeam’s Board of Directors named
Dunlap CEO in July 1996 under similar circumstances. However, this time the outcome was quite
different.17
Sunbeam Corporation’s financial results in 1996 and 1997 are consistent with managers who
follow the “Live for Today” strategy introduced earlier. Specifically, the firm reported 1997 net income
of  $109.4 million that, in retrospect, appears to be highly inflated, after reporting a loss in excess of
$200 million in 1996.
10 In terms of accruals, a manager following the “Live for Today” strategy
minimizes discretionary accruals in order to maximize reported earnings. This outcome follows from
the assumption that the manager’s marginal bonus is positive, the marginal penalty is negative, and the
discount rate for next period’s earnings is infinite. Under an employment agreement filed with the
SEC, Sunbeam granted Dunlap one million shares of restricted stock and options on 2.5 million shares
of Sunbeam stock at an exercise price of $12.25. Both the stock grant and options fully vested in the
event of a change in control. In addition, Dunlap bought $3 million of Sunbeam stock with his own
money. Dunlap stood to gain substantially if Sunbeam’s stock price increased with each $1 of share
value over the exercise price worth at least $3.5 million if Dunlap could sell the firm.  Dunlap’s
eventual dismissal as CEO of Sunbeam indicates, at least ex post, that Dunlap faced a substantial
penalty for poor performance. Having succeeded at Scott Paper along with the positive press and run-
up in Sunbeam’s stock price after the announcement of his appointment at CEO, Dunlap likely gave
any potential negative penalty a very low probability. Thus, the conditions for a manager to follow
“Live for Today” seem to have applied to Dunlap in 1997. According to Laing (1998), the reported
earnings in 1996 and 1997 reflect the outcome suggested by “Live for Today.”
Given Dunlap’s reputation as a turnaround specialist, investors immediately bid Sunbeam’s
stock price higher after the announcement that Dunlap would be CEO. In June 1996 Sunbeam’s stock
traded at $12.50 a share on the day that Dunlap took control only to increase to $53 a share in March
1998 just prior to Sunbeam reporting a large quarterly loss.
11 In 1996, market participants likely
believed that Dunlap would try to quickly restructure Sunbeam and improve its operating performance
in order to sell the firm, similar to what occurred with Scott Paper. In fact, it was widely known that18
management tried to find a buyer for Sunbeam during the last part of 1997 without success, perhaps
because Sunbeam’s stock price was perceived to be too high.
12 Thus, management may have had a
short-term profit maximization objective.
13 Sunbeam needed to report profits quickly regardless of
what would come later in order to effect a sale. In addition to the stock grant and options described
previously, early in 1998 Dunlap further negotiated an increase in salary from $1 million to $2 million
and a corresponding increase in benefits. This is consistent with a variable bonus that is positively
related to reported earnings. Given that Sunbeam reported a large loss in both 1998 and 1999 and
Dunlap lost his job, the variable penalty was negative ex post.
14
Laing (1998) identifies a series of discretionary accounting representations that had the effect
of raising reported earnings in 1997. First, even though Sunbeam’s sales increased by 18.7% in 1997,
the firm’s allowance for doubtful accounts and cash discounts dropped from $23.4 million to $8.4
million from year-end 1996 to year-end 1997. In contrast, the allowance increased in the preceding
years. Second, Sunbeam’s prepaid expenses fell from $40.4 million to $17.2 million from 1996 to 1997,
which is consistent with Sunbeam prepaying a portion of normal operating expenses for 1997,
presumably because 1996 was already a loss year given that Sunbeam was taking a $337 million
restructuring charge. Third, Sunbeam normally set aside reserves for product warranties and other
items. Such reserves were reduced in 1997 unlike prior periods. Fourth, management lowered the
reported value of fixed assets and trademarks by $92 million in 1996 as part of the restructuring
charge, yet fixed assets grew by $21 million in 1997. Laing (1998) argued that Sunbeam was effectively
capitalizing some marketing and advertising expenses that would normally be deducted as operating
expenses. Finally, management appears to have inflated reported 1997 earnings by accruing revenues
for questionable sales. Specifically, Sunbeam reported sales under “early buy” programs that allowed
customers to delay payment for as long as six months, and further offered terms on sales that allowed
customers to return items at no cost.19
The net result of these accounting representations was to generate a reported net income of
$109.4 million for Sunbeam in 1997. In comparison,  Laing (1998) estimated that questionable
accounting treatment artificially increased Sunbeam’s earnings by $120 million in 1997 such that actual
operating earnings were negative.
B.        Citicorp and the “Occasional Big Bath”
On February 20, 1987, Brazil announced a debt moratorium in which the government
suspended interest payments owed to foreign banks. This announcement was widely seen as a signal
that foreign banks would suffer losses from their holdings of loans to Brazil and potentially to other
less developed countries. At the time of the announcement, Citicorp, one of the largest U.S. bank
holding companies, held $4.6 billion in sovereign debt to Brazil, which represented an exposure equal
to 36 percent of its primary capital. Of this outstanding debt, a small amount was identified as
nonperforming. The bank’s aggregate loan exposure to less developed countries was far higher.
On May 19, 1987, Citicorp announced that it was adding $3 billion to its allowance for loan
losses primarily related to the sovereign debt it held. The bank’s allowance at the end of 1986 was
slightly below $1.7 billion, such that $3 billion represented an increase in the reserve of more than 75
percent. From February 20, 1987 through May 19, 1987, Citicorp’s common stock price fell from
$58.25 to $50.63, or 13 percent. Interestingly, the day after Citicorp’s announcement of the increased
allowance, the bank’s stock price increased by $2.50 per share, or almost 5 percent.
15
A key issue is whether management made an unbiased forecast of its actual losses ex ante.
While we cannot assess this directly, Citicorp’s decision to increase its allowance for loan losses by $3
billion is consistent with managers who follow the “Occasional Big Bath” strategy introduced earlier.
Specifically, analysts, investors, and other market participants knew of Citicorp’s sovereign debt
problem and the difficulty it provided management in reporting credible earnings. In fact, well before
Brazil’s decision to impose a debt service moratorium, market participants were familiar with the20
general international debt crisis and the potential impact on lenders. At one point, Paul Volcker,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, strong-armed many of the largest U.S. banks into refinancing
debts of Latin American countries even though many were initially unwilling.
16  By not formally
recognizing the potential loan problems and setting aside specific reserves, Citicorp’s prior earnings
were clearly too high, but the magnitude was not known, especially by outsiders.
A manager following the “Occasional Big Bath” strategy generally attempts to achieve the
periodic earnings target, if possible. In Citicorp’s case, no published earnings target was credible to
outsiders because management provided no information regarding its potential problem assets and the
true value of its debt. Thus, Citicorp could not attain its reported earnings target for the current period
without providing an estimate of problem loans and loan losses. Once Reed decided to increase
provisions by a reasonable amount, there was little chance that Citicorp would report positive earnings.
Because the 1987 earnings target was likely unattainable, Citicorp’s management could maximize the
probability of attaining subsequent periods’ earnings targets by setting the maximum value for loan
loss provisions in mid-1987.
17 This outcome may have been driven by Citicorp’s inability to meet its
earnings target.
The bad loans to less developed countries came under the management of Walter Wriston and
not John Reed at Citicorp. Thus, Reed was likely not concerned that his job or compensation would
be affected by the reported provisions. Still, the outcome follows from assuming that the discount rate
applied to future earnings be positive, the same fixed bonus be paid in the current and subsequent
periods, and that any change in reported earnings will not trigger a variable bonus or penalty. These
assumptions seem plausible given Citicorp’s dominant leadership role among large U.S. banking
organizations and the fact that most other banks with substantive exposure followed Citicorp’s lead in
setting aside reserves.
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Using annual data from the FRY-9 reporting form filed with the Federal Reserve, Figure 5
shows that Citicorp’s reported provisions for loan losses relative to the previous year’s net loans were
substantially higher in 1987 than in any other year. The finding is consistent with Citicorp’s 1987
provision for loan losses representing a “Big Bath.” Note also that in 1988 the ratio took its lowest
value over the entire time interval. This is consistent with managers choosing a sufficiently large value
of discretionary accruals in 1987 to where the bank would be better situated to meet management’s
earnings target in 1988. Finally, the ratio generally rises from 1989 through 1992 when it again reaches
a relative peak. In the 1988 annual report, Reed reported that “There were a number of unusual items
in 1988 that should be noted. We recorded $333 million of interest from Brazil that more properly
belongs in 1987.” Ex ante, management thus appears to have overstated its loss in 1987.
The pattern in provisions suggests that Citicorp’s large provision in 1987 was not a regular
event, but  is consistent with the view that it was an occasional outcome.
19  This view is reinforced by
anecdotal evidence.  Horowitz (1987) quoted Reed as saying “The move (concerning provisions) also
takes away the need for significant future reserve building … . The chairman of the nation’s largest
bank sounded almost gee-whiz about the write-offs the bank might take and the implications of the
reserve buildup. He labeled as ‘flaky’ and ‘very judgmental’ his estimate that over the next two to three
years the bank may draw about $1 billion from the … reserve.” Zweig (1995) also suggests that the
1987 reserves were on the high side to boost future earnings, noting “But some harbored serious
doubts whether 1988 earnings were for real. The 1988 provision for loan losses was $1.33 billion, $500
million less than the 1986 level, was artificially low, according to one knowledgeable Citibank source.”
C.         Implications
The fundamental implication of these examples is that managers can potentially select
discretionary accruals to manage the firm’s reported earnings and thereby maximize their own
compensation. In the case of Sunbeam, management attempted to minimize current accruals in order22
to maximize current earnings. Citicorp’s occasional large provision for loan losses was potentially
driven by management’s inability to meet a current earnings target and subsequent intent to take the
largest provision possible to better position the bank to meet its next year’s earnings target. Not all
managers and firms have an incentive to smooth earnings.
V. Conclusion
Several papers using different models have produced two general implications for managing
earnings; firms should always smooth earnings or they should sooth except when the target is
unattainable --- in which case they should take a big bath. This paper shows that both results may be
obtained in the same model by changing a few parameter values. Moreover, we show that two other
policies, Live for Today and Maximize Variability not previously found in the theoretical literature,
may also be generated within the same model. Our results may be of assistance in developing models
that link optimal compensation policy to earnings management by illustrating how the different
elements in compensation systems influence earnings management. Our results may also assist
empirical work on earnings management by highlighting the need to understand management
compensation.
We also examine circumstances surrounding the use of accruals at Sunbeam in 1996-1997 and
at Citicorp around its 1987 dramatic one-time increase in provisions for loan losses. We find that these
firms’ management of earnings was consistent with our theory, in particular, that their respective
management compensation policies for the CEO encouraged earnings management that is consistent
with the Live for Today and Occasional Big Bath strategies, respectively.23
                 Endnotes
1.  The remarks by Chairman Levitt were to the NYU Center for Law and Business on September 28,
1998. See  Loomis (1999) for a discussion of the SEC’s overall efforts to address corporate
earnings management.
2.  A potential weakness of the studies of Healy (1985) and Degeorge, Patel and Zechhauser (1999) is
that they may use  suboptimal compensation functions because the parameters of their
compensation function are not determined in an explicit model of shareholder wealth
maximization. However, the type of compensation functions analyzed by Healy and Degeorge, et
al. are of more than theoretical interest as these types of functions are observed in practice. The
models by Lambert (1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) are no more general because the form
of their compensation function is determined outside the model with at most a few parameters
determined endogenously. Dye (1988) does allow for a general compensation function, but the
more realistic version of his model may result in increased income variability. Dye defines income
smoothing as the firm managing earnings to boost income in one period and reduce it in the
following period, or vice versa. In the first version of the model, the manager cannot shift
consumption from one period to another and income smoothing follows directly (for his
definition of smoothing but likely to hold under most definitions.) In the second model, Dye
demonstrates that the manager would shift income across periods if the manager could borrow or
save provided that the cost of borowing and return to savings are not equal to the expected return
from shifting income from one period to the next. The second version leaves open the possibility
that the manager might always boost first period income or might always defer first period
income. This result qualifies as income smoothing under Dye’s definition, but would fail under
many other reasonable definitions.24
3.  The model may also be applied to revenue increasing accruals by interpreting these accruals as
negative expenses.
4.  The setting is similar in that both frameworks depend on the manager being subject to a penalty
for underperforming.
5.  The inclusion of a variable penalty for missing the earnings target seems inconsistent with the
manager earning a fixed salary.  One way of interpreting this penalty would be that the probability
that the manager would be fired is an increasing function of the amount by which the firm misses
its earnings target.
6.  See Brooks (1998) who documents circumstances surrounding the SEC’s requirement that
SunTrust restate its loan loss provisions to lower its loss allowance.
7.  Dechow and Sloan (1991), also argue that the reduction in R&D expenditures is less likely  if the
CEOs’ compensation and/or wealth is also tied to firm value. Thus, if CEOs have contracts that
provide stock-based compensation, it is less likely that they will lower firm  R&D expenditures.
Their empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis. R&D expenditures are generally
reduced less during a CEO’s final years if the CEO owns stock and stock options in the firm.
These results would not necessarily carry over to  accruals management because there is not
necessarily a direct relationship between the strategic change in discretionary accruals and firm
value.  Accruals management does not change the firm’s investment policy, unlike R&D
expenditures. Thus, stock and/or stock option ownership may not mitigate the effects of
discretionary accruals.
8.  Dechow and Sloan (1991) also investigate whether the same relationships hold true for accounting
accruals, but find no statistical relationship. One interpretation of this result is that CEOs do not
manage accruals any differently as they approach departure. However,  the empirical analysis only
looks at the growth rate of total accruals and lacks any control25
      for the non-discretionary elements of accruals. Thus, their inability to find accruals
      management may simply reflect a lack of power in their tests. Dechow and Sloan (1991)
      also rovide a case study of CEO turnover at Merck & Co. Their evidence on overall
      accruals is mixed, possibly reflecting a lack of controls for non-discretionary accruals.
      However, the one accrual that they specifically mention, pension liabilities, was changed by
      management in a way that boosted reported net income in the year of CEO retirement.
9.  Business Week (1998) reported that Dunlap demanded the support of the Board of
      Directors of Sunbeam and got angry when he failed to get it stating, “Either we get the
      support we should have or Russ (chief financial officer) and I are prepared to go….Just
      pay us.” Dunlap has filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam requesting payment for lost services.
10. Jonathan Laing (1998) identifies numerous strategies that Sunbeam presumably followed to
      shift expenses to 1996 and shift income to 1997. See “Dangerous Games,” Barron’s,
      June 8, 1998.
11. In October 2000, Sunbeam’s stock was trading around $1 per share.
12. In October 1987, Dunlap hired Morgan Stanley Dean Witter to help Sunbeam find a buyer
      according to Business Week (1998).
13.  This analysis of Sunbeam concentrates on its management of accruals because it is the
       focus of the research and is not intended to imply that the firm’s subsequent difficulties
       were due to accruals management. Sunbeam’s fate was almost entirely determined by the
       operating decisions made by management during the period before and after Dunlap’s
       tenure as CEO.
14. Although Dunlap stood to make substantial gains if he had turned the firm around and sold it, the
losses he incurred on his personal investment in Sunbeam stock appear to have exceeded his
earnings while he was CEO of Sunbeam.26
15.  Using standard event study methodology, Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) document
       conditions surrounding Citicorp’s announcement and the reaction of common stock
       prices of the 25 largest U.S. bank holding companies around the time of the
       announcement.
16.  Zweig (1995 ) claims that John Reed, CEO of Citicorp, was angry at Volcker for forcing Citicorp
to participate in the refinancing.
17. Musemici and Sinkey (1990) argue that Citicorp’s management was signalling both future
      loan charge-offs and a more aggressive posture in negotiating terms for paying off debt to
      less developed countries. These objectives may also be consistent with maximizing
      managers’ compensation.
18. Musemici and Sinkey (1990) demonstrate that most of the top 25 banking organizations
      increased their loan loss allowances immediately following Citicorp’s decision. In general, it
      would have been difficult not to set aside additional reserves unless the bank had already
      written down the loans to a value near what Citicorp and other banks deemed appropriate
      because regulators and accountants would have required it.
19. Similar results for 1987, 1988 and the 1990-1992 period are obtained for the ratios of loan loss
provisions to the previous year’s allowance for loan losses, and the ratio of provisions to the
current year’s net charge-offs. Figures demonstrating these relationships are availabe upon request.27
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 Strategy: A manager always minimizes discretionary accruals.
where
ME = discounted value of managerial earnings, and
DAt. = discretionary loan loss provisions at time t,
DAt
* = the level of discretionary loan loss provisions such that managers exactly meet their






Strategy: If possible, a manager will exactly attain the net income target.
•  If latent earnings are above the target, a manager will maximize DA.
•  If latent earnings are below the target, a manager will minimize DA.
where
ME = discounted value of managerial earnings, and
DAt. = discretionary loan loss provisions at time t,
DAt
* = the level of discretionary loan loss provisions such that managers exactly meet their







Strategy: If possible, a manager will always attain the net income target.
If it is not possible to attain the target, a manager will always report the maximum
DA permitted.
where
ME = discounted value of managerial earnings, and
DAt. = discretionary loan loss provisions at time t,
DAt
* = the level of discretionary loan loss provisions such that managers exactly meet their







Strategy: A manager will select DA in order to move the firm farther away from
it’s net income target.
where
ME = discounted value of managerial earnings, and
DAt. = discretionary loan loss provisions at time t,
DAt
* = the level of discretionary loan loss provisions such that managers exactly meet their
time t earnings target.33
Table 1
Possible Outcomes in the General Case
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